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CAPITATION: THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF
USING CAPITATION TO AFFECT
PHYSICIAN DECISION-MAKING
PROCESSES
Andrew Ruskin
I. INTRODUCTION
Although it is at best a mixed blessing, capitation has taken firm root in
America's health care reimbursement system. Capitation refers to the
prospective payment of a fixed sum per period for each patient under the
care of a selected provider, regardless of the actual costs incurred by the
provider in treating the patient.' As one of the primary tools used by
managed care organizations ("MCOs") to bring about health care cost
containment, capitation symbolizes the way that managed care has at-
tempted to revolutionize the health care industry.' Because of its per-
ceived success in lowering costs, MCOs are using capitation with
increasing frequency.3 The increased prevalence of this payment mecha-
1. MARK V. PAULY ET AL., PAYING PHYSICIANS: OPTIONS FOR CONTROLLING COST,
VOLUME, AND INTENSITY OF SERVICES 101 (1992).
2. See William A. Chittenden III, Malpractice Liability and Managed Health Care:
History and Prognosis, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 451, 476 (1991) (stating that cost containment
measures form the heart of managed care).
Some evidence shows that capitation can be successful at lowering medical costs. Ac-
counting for self-selection by using a randomized, controlled trial, one study of the use of
services in different insurance plans found that the capitated population health expendi-
tures were 28% less than fee for service plans. PAULY ET AL., supra note 1, at 111.
Although this study prevented study bias arising from healthier patients' self-selection of
managed care plans, many studies touting cost reduction in MCOs can be misleading be-
cause of their failure to consider this factor. Reed Neil Olsen, The Impact of Health Main-
tenance Organizations on Health and Health Care Costs, 25 APPLIED ECON. 1451, 1451-52
(1993).
There also is some debate as to whether capitation and other risk sharing devices lower
medical costs by sacrificing quality of care. At this point, there is no clear evidence as to
their effects on quality. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Requirements for Physician
Incentive Plans in Prepaid Health Care Organizations, 57 Fed. Reg. 59,024, 59,031 (1992).
Even if some proof existed that risk sharing improved the health of enrollees, it would
need to be tempered with an understanding of the enrollment of healthier patients in
MCOs as a result of self-selection. Olsen, supra, at 1451.
3. Present estimates suggest that approximately six percent of all health care plan
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nism should trigger legal scrutiny to determine its affect on the relation-
ships of patients, MCOs, and physicians. Legislators then could use any
resulting insights to better implement health care policies, while courts
might better determine the party, responsible for adverse medical out-
comes that occur in a capitated setting.
This Article examines some of the ways that capitation impacts the de-
cision-making processes of physicians, along with some of their potential
legal ramifications. It first applies financial risk theory analysis to capita-
tion to show how the various components of risk, inherent in capitation
payments to physicians, can be determined. Next, it reviews various legal
developments that suggest an insufficiency of compensation for risk could
create legal liability for the MCO. To help lawmakers properly address
the problem of insufficient compensation, this Article provides a frame-
work for examining the minimum capitation rate necessary to compen-
sate the physician for the components of risk confronting him. Following
this analysis, the Article examines the mechanism by which capitation can
directly control a physician's mode of practice. This examination consid-
ers the legal theories for finding an MCO liable when a physician under
the direct control of the MCO acts inappropriately. It also offers a
method of analysis for determining if capitation leads to control over a
physician in a particular case. Finally, this Article suggests that other
payment mechanisms could serve many of the same purposes for which
capitation presently is used, while posing less of an intrusion into the phy-
sician's decision-making processes.
II. FINAN'CIAL RISK ARISING FROM CAPITATION
Through capitation, managed care organizations share financial risk
with providers. Whereas traditional forms of health care financing do not
rely on risk sharing methods, MCOs believe that their reimbursement
enrollees are covered under a fully capitated plan. Julie Johnsson & Mike Mitka, Show-
down at Capitation Corral: Control of System Hangs in Balance, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 15,
1994, at 1, 1. Among HMOs, it is estimated that about 54% of all plans rely on capitation
of their physicians to keep costs down. Id. Some experts predict that by the year 2005,
about 50% of the entire population of the United States will be covered by a capitated
plan. Id. at 24. This figure already describes certain heavily capitated markets, such as
Southern California which has a capitation rate around 50% of its population, and Boston
which has around 35% of its population in plans using capitation. Jeannie Mandelker, The
Unprecedented Shift to Managed Care is Resulting in Lower Health Costs, as the Private
Sector Uses its Economic Clout to Transform Health Care Delivery in Ways Congress Can
Never Hope to Match, Bus. & HEALTH, THE STATE OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, Jan.
1995, at 8, 9.
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strategy gives physicians an incentive to make more cost conscious deci-
sions in treating their patients.4 Until recently, all health care providers
were paid under a fee-for-service system, receiving reimbursement for all
the procedures they provided, at a price that the providers controlled.5
This system created an incentive to overtreat patients by delivering un-
necessary services.6 Because MCOs place financial risk on providers, by
paying them a fixed amount regardless of the labor and supplies involved
in patient care,7 they replace the incentive to overtreat with an incentive
to provide less care.8 Although less care sometimes results in sounder,
more cost-effective care,9 overly severe financial incentives may lead the
physician to provide insufficient, substandard treatment in some in-
stances.' ° As it always has been public policy to protect patients, courts
and legislatures need to determine whether an MCO retains legal conse-
quences for- the effects its capitation rates have on a provider's treatment.
A. Financial Model of Risk
Financial analysts long have understood the importance of risk in de-
termining the proper return on an investment. Risk theory revolves
around the principle that a certain dollar is worth more than an uncertain
4. MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST 135 (1993).
5. Id. at 2. Although in a fee-for-service system physicians can set their own prices,
some indemnity insurers set their own limits on reimbursements to avoid losing all control
over their expenditures. The limit is based on a combination of the usual, customary, and
reasonable ("UCR") rates for a service. HENRY BERMAN, M.D. & LOUISA ROSE, CHOOS-
ING THE RIGHT HEALTH CARE PLAN 23 (1990).
6. BERMAN & ROSE, supra note 5, at 112.
7. MCOs also use other techniques besides capitation for placing risk on providers,
such as withholdings and bonuses. See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the need to look at financial incentives upon providers created by MCOs in their
entirety).
8. RODWIN, supra note 4, at 153.
9.. For example, capitated physicians have an incentive to find more cost-effective
means of achieving improved treatment results. Jerome R. Gardner & Roxy Maroney,
Positioning for Capitation by Redesigning Internal Processes, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT.,
40, 42 (July 1995). They also have an incentive to engage in more preventive treatment,
which is less expensive than treating patients after they get sick. Leigh Page, Can Plans
Manage the Preventive Care Diabetics Need?, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 20, 1995, at 4, 4. Thus
if properly implemented, cost containment can lead to a healthier population with fewer
health care expenditures.
10. See RODWIN, supra note 4, at 145 (noting the many lawsuits and anecdotal inci-
dents suggesting that strong financial incentives have led to the withholding of services to
the patient's detriment).
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dollar.'" Accordingly, financial analysis entails the quantification of the
risk of receiving a profit on one's investment with a determination of the
corresponding level of return required to compensate for the risk in-
volved.'" When examining a stock, investors look at the stock at several
different levels: first, they examine the stock itself to determine how
much risk it presents; second, they determine what effect the stock will
have on their portfolio; and third, they decide how to combine their port-
folio of stocks with a risk free investment, such as a government bond, to
further create a risk and return level with which they are comfortable.13
Each level presents different analytical issues and needs to be examined
separately.
Investors begin their risk analysis of a stock investment by looking at
the stock itself. A stock's risk level is determined by examining the his-
toric variability associated with the stock price.1 4 Investors first calculate
a weighted average of all the stock's returns based on a series of price
observations made over a period of time.' 5 The sample of returns must
be large enough to make a bell curve distribution upon which a formal
statistical analysis can be based.16 Investors then calculate the stock's va-
riance around its average by subtracting the mean return from each indi-
vidual return, squaring each amount, and adding up the squares.17 This
figure is called the stock's variance, and the square root of the variance is
the stock's standard deviation.' 8 As the standard deviation increases, in-
vestors will require greater returns on their investment to compensate
them for the greater degree of risk. 9 Hence, the price of a stock de-
creases as its risk increases until the expected return on the stock reaches
11. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE Fi-
NANCE 13 (4th ed. 1991).
12. Id. at 129 (referring to the required level of return as the opportunity cost of
capital).
13. Id. at 131-61.
14. Id. at 135.
15. Id. at 134 (explaining this technique by using a coin tossing game as a model). For
example, suppose that a sample generated the following five returns: 10%, 12%, 12%,
13%, and 14%. The weighted average would be 12.2%, i.e.: (10 + 12 + 12 + 13 + 14)/5.
16. PAUL G. HOEL & RAYMOND J. JESSEN, BASIC STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECO-
NOMICS 157 (2d ed. 1977).
17. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 11, at 134. Based on the figures from the previous
example, this total would be 8.8%, i.e.: (12.2 - 10)2 + (12.2 - 12)2 + (12.2 - 12)2 + (13 -
12.2)2 + (14 - 12.2)2.
18. Id. The standard deviation here would be 2.97, i.e.:- 8
19. See id. at 131, 135 (demonstrating through tables that different classes of financial
instruments exhibit different rates of return that are correlated with their standard
deviations).
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a level appropriate for its risk.2" Through this analytical tool, investors
tie the stock's price with its expected magnitude of variation.
Even if a stock is particularly risky, investors can remove some of the
risk by owning simultaneously several stocks. In this way, investors can
diversify the risk through a stock portfolio, which allows them to narrow
the range of variability in their returns.2 1 However, there is no attenua-
tion of the level of return in diversification, and thus portfolio owners
receive a higher return at a certain level of risk than they can get from
any individual stock. 2 The effectiveness of diversification depends upon
both the number of stocks in a portfolio and the covariance of the stocks
to each other.23 When an efficient portfolio is created, the risk level of its
entirety of stocks in the portfolio becomes the market risk level, as op-
posed to the unique risk of any individual stock.24 Thus, even a risky
stock can be a smart investment for a risk-averse investor who is more
concerned about its effect on the portfolio as a whole.
Although stocks always pose some risk, even in portfolio, investors can
combine stocks with risk-free investments to obtain an ideal level of risk
and return. Investors can reduce the risk to which they are exposed,
below the market risk level, by combining a stock portfolio with govern-
ment bonds.2 5 Hence, rather than working only at the individual stock
level, rational investors analyze a stock's risk in conjunction with its effect
on their portfolios, and consider their ability to further diversify away the
portfolio risk with risk-free investments.
B. Application of the Financial Model of Risk to Capitation
As capitation results in providers' assumption of risk of profit and loss,
it is appropriate to study capitation rates under the same rubric as finan-
cial risk analysis. Although physicians traditionally have not engaged in a
risk analysis as formal as investors in the stock market, risk sharing works
on the principle that physicians are making intuitive judgments in this
area. 6 Thus, when a risk analysis shows that a capitation rate leads to a
20. See id. at 13 (showing that the monetary value of an investment is inversely pro-
portional to its rate of return).
21. Id. at 137.
22. Id. at 158 (demonstrating this phenomenon on a graph).
23. Id. at 142.
24. Id. at 137. Market risk refers to the risk inherent in global factors affecting the
market. Investors can only diversify the unique risk associated with an individual stock in
their portfolios. Id.
25. Id. at 159-61.
26. See RODWIN, supra note 4, at 156 (expressing incredulity at the view of many pro-
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risk-adjusted income per patient below the physician's cost per patient, it
creates a dangerous propensity for physicians to protect themselves from
financial loss by reducing their level of care below their normal prac-
tices." This reduction might indicate a provider fell below the legal stan-
dard of care, and may result in an adverse medical outcome.
To protect against these outcomes, MCOs, physicians, and legal ana-
lysts must examine the risk factor of different capitation systems. Each
one can be regarded as a different security with its own risk level.28 The
risk level of the plans can be compared to each other by looking at their
standard deviations.29 Once the risk level presented to a provider is de-
termined, the risk examiner then determines if there are mechanisms in
place that diversify the physician's risk. This examination of diversifica-
ponents of risk sharing techniques that this mechanism only creates positive incentives
without creating negative ones).
27. Because of the nature of health care delivery in a managed care environment, this
hypothesis might be impossible to prove empirically. For instance, MCOs often use a com-
bination of financial incentives, which would make it impossible to determine the effect of
any one in isolation. Id. at 147. See also infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the need to look at financial incentives in the aggregate before determining if a
capitation rate is impermissibly low). Further, it is impossible to second guess which serv-
ices a physician would have performed but for the financial incentives. RODWiN, supra
note 4, at 146. However, there is data that shows capitation reduces physicians' health care
expenditures. Supra note 2. Economic theory would embellish upon this figure by stating
that stronger incentives are more likely than weaker incentives to reduce services to a
dangerous level. RODWIN, supra note 4, at 147. See also Managed Care ... A View From
the Inside, 30 MED. MARKETING & MEDIA, May 1995, at 26, 38-40 (quoting one radiologist
as saying that cost becomes more important than safety in choosing contrast materials for
radiologists facing bankruptcy). Thus there is at least sound reasoning with at least some
anecdotal support for this hypothesis.
Because physicians consider a whole range of factors in providing treatment, it might be
insufficient to say that financial loss alone creates dangerous incentives to undertreat. For
example, physicians are not likely to have perfect information regarding the degree of risk
to which they are exposed. Because a large subset of physicians, like the overall popula-
tion, are risk averse, they likely would overestimate their level of risk. This suggests that a
risk-adjusted breakeven capitation rate is still dangerously low. However, this considera-
tion finds its counteracting effect in physicians' calculations of expected malpractice pre-
mium increases resulting from adverse outcomes as well as calculations of lost income due
to a loss of patients after acquiring a bad reputation within a community. Cf. BERMAN &
ROSE, supra note 5, at 120 (discussing disincentives for Health Maintenance Organizations
("HMOs") to undertreat). Because of the opposite effects of these factors, perhaps the
break-even point is the best estimate of the threshold beyond which incentives become
dangerous.
28. Richard E. Schroeder et al., Pricing Medical Services in the Managed Care Envi-
ronment, Topics HEALTH CARE FIN., Winter 1992, at 58, 58.
29. See Susanna E. Krentz, Risk Versus Uncertainty in Managed Care Contracting,
HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Oct. 1994, at 22, 22 (suggesting that providers reduce their
standard deviations to increase the predictability of their costs).
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tion should include an analysis of any risk free income, which further al-
lows the provider to adjust his risk level to accommodate personal
preferences. When this risk-adjusted income actually shows a loss,
lawmakers might decide that this rate is too great an incentive to cut back
on services. Accordingly, lawmakers may pass legislation preventing
MCOs from refusing coverage, and holding the MCO liable for the physi-
cian's adverse outcomes.
At the most fundamental level, the physician and MCO need to under-
stand the variance facing the physician by the portion of the organiza-
tion's patient population for whom the physician will assume financial
responsibility. Before a physician can assume that there will be any regu-
lar pattern to his patient costs, he must have a sizable number of patients
for whom he receives capitation each month.30 Once a physician attains a
critical number of patients, his costs for treating them will follow a nor-
mal distribution from which he can derive an average cost per enrollee as
well as a standard deviation.
Various factors affect the standard deviation of the costs of treating a
given enrollee population. The demographics of a population can influ-
ence greatly the range of costs of care that a physician confronts in as-
suming responsibility for a population.31 Hence, the physician and MCO
need to determine the respective percentages of the different demo-
graphic groups within the physician's enrollee population.32 Whereas a
homogenous population would mean low financial risk, a polarized group
that falls mostly into the extremes of high and low utilizers would mean
high financial risk and a greater potential incentive to undertreat in the
absence of adequate compensation for the risk factor.33 Another source
30. DAVID W. LEE, .PH.D., CAPITATION: THE PHYSICIAN'S GUIDE 29 (1995). The
number of enrollees needed varies with the level of care provided. Accordingly, some
experts believe that a primary care physician only needs about 200 enrollees to eliminate
sample size risk, while a specialist will need a much larger number. Greg Borzo, Breaking
the Capitation Bronco, AM. MED. NEWS, Apr. 18, 1994, at 19, 20.
31. See PAULY ET AL., supra note 1, at 107 (noting that some physicians attract a high
cost group of patients).
32. Borzo, supra note 30, at 20. Age and sex seem to be the most important factors
here, but disease trends and socioeconomic factors also play a role in determining the
likely range of costs confronting a physician. Id.
33. Cf. PAULY ET AL., supra note 1, at 107 (discussing the potential for physicians to
respond to a group of high cost patients by lowering their quality of care). Pauly et al. also
assert that inadequate compensation for a sicker patient group might lead physicians to
refuse accepting high risk patients as part of their patient pool, which would lead to their
reduced access to health care services. Id. at 108. Thus they suggest that capitation should
be readjusted periodically to compensate for the severity level of a doctor's patients. Id.
1997]
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of variation in a physician's costs is the cost range of services for which he
financially is at risk.34 Thus, a primary care physician who is required to
pay for hospital and specialists' services out of his capitation rate is more
likely to be at a high financial risk, endangering the standard of patient
care, than a physician who only had to pay for his own services from his
capitation.35  By studying the factors that affect the shape of the bell
curve of health care costs of enrollees, lawmakers can better understand
whether the risk premium within the physician's capitation rate is a suffi-
cient prophylactic against underutilization.
Although one can derive the proper risk premium for an individual
physician's capitation rate from the nature of his expected variance, a
further adjustment is necessary for a physician practicing in a group set-
ting. In a group practice, the risk posed by overutilization of any one
physician's patient population is reduced through diversification. Within
any given period of high patient utilization for one physician, the group
practice in the aggregate will likely experience a more steady rate of utili-
zation. 36  Hence, diversification alleviates both the danger of financial
loss and, consequently, the danger of harsh financial incentives to under-
treat.37 Impacting greatly on risk when even a small group of doctors join
together,38 the diversification factor affects the risk level inherent in
34. Id. at 106. Specialists intrinsically face greater variation of costs than primary care
physicians because they provide more costly services to a sicker patient group. Paul R.
DeMuro, F.H.F.M.A., C.M.P.A., C.P.A., M.B.A., J.D., Paying Specialists and Subspecialists
on a Capitated Basis, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., July 1995, at 32, 34. Accordingly, MCOs
must be careful in accounting for risk when capitating specialists.
35. RODWIN, supra note 4, at 142. Although the elevated risk associated with increas-
ing the number of services for which the physician is responsible also leads to a greater
danger to the patient, removing the financial risk for noncapitated specialists' services alto-
gether gives primary care physicians an incentive to substitute specialist services for their
noncapitated own. PAULY ET AL., supra note 1, at 106. If a plan chooses to hold a primary
care physician responsible for specialist services, the primary care physician can either re-
imburse specialists using a fee-for-service system or a capitation system. If he reimburses
them with fee-for-service payments, he loses control over the patient's health care expendi-
tures, which increases his risk. DeMuro, supra note 34, at 33. Yet, as stated (supra note
34), capitation of specialists places an inordinate amount of risk on these providers. Be-
cause of all the dangers inherent in shifting the risk for other providers' services to the
primary care physician, MCOs should use relatively weak financial incentives to control
the potential for overutilization of these services.
36. See RODWIN, supra note 4, at 141 (stating that physicians in a large group practice
bear less risk than physicians in a small one).
37. Cf PAULY ET AL., supra note 1, at 103 (noting that physicians in a small risk pool
more likely are to be aware of each other's resource utilization, which leads them to be
more attentive to controlling each other's costs).
38. Cf BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 11, at 137 (explaining that the bulk of the
effect on risk stemming from diversification comes from the first few stocks and diminishes
1997] Capitation
agreements between MCOs and almost all group practices. 39 Because di-
versification can reduce the nature of the risk associated with a physi-
cian's income, courts and legislatures should give the MCOs greater
latitude in determining the capitation rate for physicians in a group
practice.
In addition to countervailing forces of variation and diversification, the
physician's ability to further reduce risk through the receipt of risk free
health care financing also is a relevant factor in determining an appropri-
ate risk premium. Fee-for-service coverage allows physicians to charge
standard rates for the services they choose to provide, and accordingly
there is virtually no risk attached to providing services in such an environ-
ment.4" If a physician practicing within a capitated environment also pro-
vides care to a substantial number of patients with fee-for-service type
financing, the risk incurred from the capitated reimbursements would
create less risk of loss overall.41 Hence the physician practicing under
these circumstances would be less likely to lower his provision of services
almost entirely after about 20 stocks). Although covariance is also an important factor in
determining the effectiveness of diversification in stock portfolios, it is less relevant in eval-
uating diversification in a group practice. The covariance of stocks is greater than zero
when they are affected similarly by certain market conditions. See id. at 140 (explaining
that stocks tend to move together and thus have a positive covariance). Unlike this syn-
chronous responsiveness to global factors, sickness rarely is caused by a pervasive environ-
mental stimulus. Thus the covariance of different doctors practicing in a group setting
likely is around zero in most cases. Because the covariance does not likely change from
one group practice setting to another, it becomes irrelevant in comparing the risk levels of
different work environments.
39. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. Owners of diversified portfolios
experience no decrease in return from the decrease in the effect of the risk of an individual
stock when included in their portfolios. However, while stock transactions generally are
impersonal exchanges between stockholders and corporations conducted through the stock
market, in which the stockholder has no allegiance to the corporation, doctors and MCOs
usually operate under agreements formalized by contract. As part of this commitment to
work together, the MCO might insist upon receiving some of the benefit achieved through
diversifying risk in a group practice setting in the form of lower capitation rates. See, e.g.,
PAULY ET AL., supra note 1, at 113 (remarking that multi-specialty groups can lower their
costs in preparation for capitation both through group risk sharing and through economies
of scale). In contrast to the relationship between stockholders and corporations where the
stockholders alone benefit from diversification, agreements between MCOs and physicians
will likely result in a sharing of the benefits of diversification.
40. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing fee-for-service medicine).
41. See, e.g., Lauren M. Walker, Turn Capitation into a Moneymaker, MED. ECON.,
Mar. 13, 1995, at 58, 71 (noting that financial distress did not set in for one group practice
in Ohio until an HMO's capitated system accounted for about 35% of the physicians' in-
come). Part of the reason that a fee for service practice can alleviate the effects of capita-
tion is the ability to shift costs to fee-for-service insurers. Because of this tendency,
markets with high HMO penetration sometimes also present higher than ordinary costs for
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to an inappropriate level to counteract the financial risk factor.42 The
effect of risk free income can cause a significant impact on physician in-
centives. Thus, any legal analysis of the appropriate risk premium for a
physician with a given cost variance must include the degree to which the
effects of risk free income have combined with any group practice diversi-
fication effect to reduce the physician's risk.
III. POTENTIAL LEGAL LIABILITY ARISING FROM IMPROPER RISK
A. Statutory Measures and Administrative Refinements
Risk incentives are likely to interfere with a physician's judgment when
they become too onerous. Congress, therefore, has taken limited steps to
control their severity. Although Congress initially sanctioned risk sharing
within Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs"), 3 it has placed
some limits on risk sharing by Medicare HMOs." The law prohibits an
HMO from providing incentives to physicians to reduce the amount of
care they provide to specific patients.45 Further, if the HMO places phy-
sicians at substantial financial risk, it also must provide some sort of stop-
loss protection to prevent financial loss after a threshold point. 6 HMOs
that shift substantial financial risk onto their providers also must provide
documentation to their enrollees to show that the enrollees have proper
access to medical services. 4 7 All risk-sharing mechanisms must be re-
ported to the Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA"), which
has the authority to impose monetary penalties on HMOs that fail to
comply with this law. 8 Although this statute is far from a complete pro-
hibition of inappropriate risk shifting, it shows legislative intent to pre-
vent the harms that result from these mechanisms.
As Congress entrusted enforcement of this statute to HCFA, the
agency has enacted guidelines explaining its method of implementation.
non-HMO insurers. See Olsen, supra note 2, at 1451 (finding, however, that HMO compe-
tition can also force non-HMO insurers to lower their costs to retain market share).
42. Cf. PAULY ET AL., supra note 1, at 103 (asserting that physicians likely will not
change their fee-for-service practice styles to accommodate the needs of a small HMO
patient panel).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c)(2)(D) (1994).
44. Id. § 1395mm(i)(8).
45. Id. § 1395mm(i)(8)(B)(i).
46. Id. § 1395mm(i)(8)(B)(ii)(1). The statute suggests basing this threshold point on
the number of physicians in the risk pool as well as the number of patients in the physi-
cian's patient panel. Id.
47. Id. § 1395mm(i)(8)(B)(ii)(II).
48. Id. § 1395mm(i)(8)(B)(iii).
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In these guidelines,4 9 HCFA defines substantial financial risk as the po-
tential for loss of twenty-five percent or more of the provider's income
due to physician referral costs." With capitated plans that do not involve
other compensation arrangements like withholdings and bonuses, the
HMO must specify the maximum amount and the minimum amount of
the capitation at risk.51 If the difference is over twenty-five percent of the
total capitation amount, then the HMO will be considered to have placed
its providers at substantial financial risk.52 Once an HMO has been de-
termined to have imposed a substantial amount of risk upon providers, it
will have to provide stop-loss coverage.53 If the stop-loss protection is for
the physician's patient population in the aggregate, the MCO must cover
ninety percent of all expenses exceeding the twenty-five percent thresh-
old.54 For per-patient stop-loss protection, the per-patient cost threshold
beyond which the MCO must provide coverage increases in proportion to
increases in the patient panel size.55 If an HMO fails to comply with
these guidelines,56 it could face a maximum penalty of $25,000 for each
violation of the regulations.57 Although these guidelines are limited in
49. The guidelines originally were proposed in: Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Re-
quirements for Physician Incentive Plans in Prepaid Health Care Organizations [hereinaf-
ter Physician Incentive Plans], 57 Fed. Reg. 59,024 (1992). In March, 1996, they officially
became regulations, and they now are codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 417, 434, and 1003 (1996).
50. 42 C.F.R. § 417.479(e). HCFA chose 25% as its cutoff because, historically, physi-
cians voluntarily have cut their prices as much as 20 - 25% for some patients. Physician
Incentive Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. at 59,028.
51. 42 C.F.R. § 417.479(f)(5)(i).
52. Id. If an HMO failed to provide this information, the default would be that it was
placing its providers at substantial financial risk. Id. § 417.479(f)(5)(ii).
53. See infra notes 54 & 55 and accompanying text.
54. Id. § 417.479(g)(2)(i).
55. Id. § 417.479(g)(2)(ii). Note that this concern for patient panel size accords with
accepted models of risk. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30, 43-51. HCFA consid-
ered including various other factors into its analysis of risk, but it ultimately decided
against their inclusion until there is more empirical research into the effects of financial
risk on physician behavior. Physician Incentive Plans, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,430, 13,434 (1996).
Yet this decision to wait for further evidence of the impact of incentives is problematic
because of the large number of intervening variables that might make it impossible to
determine exactly how incentives work. See supra note 27 (describing why incentive mech-
anisms are difficult to study). Because it might not be possible to isolate the effects of
different types of risk sharing through empirical research, HCFA should rely more on a
theoretical approach to regulation of compensation plans, such as the one described in this
Article.
56. In addition to following Congress' directions to set up guidelines for determining
substantial financial risk, HCFA also has established standards for the implementation of
both the mandated customer surveys and the mandated disclosure to HCFA. 42 C.F.R.
§ 417.479(g)(1),(h).
57. Id. § 1003.103(f)(1).
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terms of the kinds of incentives they condemn, they manifest an adminis-
trative intention to ascertain the precise nature of risk sharing mecha-
nisms so that they can be properly regulated.
Recognizing that federal statutory guidelines still are inadequate, state
regulatory agencies are also attempting to propose rules that could be
adopted by legislatures. The National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners ("NAIC") is creating an analytical framework under which it es-
tablishes capital requirements for groups assuming full risk for their
patient populations. 58 These standards will force groups to determine re-
alistically their level of risk, which in turn will determine their required
level of capital reserves.59 Once physicians know their risk levels, they
can use these figures to negotiate reasonable capitation levels in addition
to determining the amount of capital reserves they require to protect
them from risk. As these measures likely will be adopted by state legisla-
tures, the present lack of constraints in MCO risk sharing strategies ac-
cordingly will end in those jurisdictions.
B. Common Law Developments
Although the common law has yet to find MCO liability for capitation
that did not properly consider risk, there are several cases that laid the
foundation for such a finding. Some cases focused on imperfections
within the design of cost containment mechanisms as a causative agent of
an adverse medical outcome.6" Other cases examined financial incentives
to determine if they were a per se violation of public policy.61 Although
the cases in this area resulted in divergent holdings, they established
some precedent for finding liability for shifting an inordinate amount of
risk upon a physician through capitation.
In Wickline v. State,62 the Court of Appeals for the Second District
wrote a landmark decision that created the potential for finding liability
of an MCO for the adverse medical outcomes of its enrollees. In this
case, the plaintiff claimed that Medi-Cal, California's Medicaid HMO sys-
tem, developed a faulty utilization review mechanism that led to her be-
58. Memorandum from Stephanie Lewis to State and Federal Legislative Policy (B)
Task Force: Issues Relating to Risk-Bearing Entities in the Health Insurance Market 24
(Mar. 15, 1996) (Memorandum prepared by the NAIC) (on file with author).
59. Id.
60. See infra discussion of the Wickline and Wilson decisions and accompanying notes.
61. See infra discussion of the Bush decision and accompanying notes.
62. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
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ing discharged prematurely from the hospital.63 As a result of this
discharge, she alleged that her condition worsened, and she eventually
needed to have her leg amputated.' Although the court found that
neither her treating physician nor Medi-Cal fell below the standard of
care,65 it stated in dictum that a MCO could be found liable for imperfec-
tions in its design or implementation of cost containment mechanisms.66
Because MCO reimbursement policies are similar to utilization review in
their central role among cost containment strategies, the Wickline court
created precedent for examining an MCO's rates of capitation.
The same court later clarified the meaning of the statements made in
its Wickline decision in Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern California.67 In
Wilson, the court denied the defendant insurer's motion for summary
judgment where the plaintiff sued it for the suicide of an enrollee who
was released from a psychiatric ward, despite the treating physician's
opinion that a discharge would be premature.68 After distinguishing Wic-
kline,69 the court stated that an insurer would be held liable for adverse
medical outcomes whenever its cost containment policies were found to
be a substantial factor in the harm caused by the substandard care.7" If
other courts follow this holding, they would find liability for any MCO
whose inadequate capitation was a substantial factor in creating harm to a
patient.
Although there are no reported cases involving allegations that im-
proper financial incentives have led to a patient's injury, there are several
cases that have questioned whether financial incentives should be toler-
63. Id. at 811. As proof of the prematurity of the discharge, the plaintiff brought the
court's attention to the fact that Medi-Cal only granted her a four-day extension beyond
her original discharge date despite her treating physician's recommendation of eight days.
Id. at 813-14.
64. Id. at 811.
65. Id. at 819.
66. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819. However, it also stated that the physician bears
primary responsibility for the care of the patient. Id. Though the court held both parties
responsible for the care received, it failed to give any guidance as to where the distinction
could be drawn between the physician's and the MCO's duties in this opinion.
67. 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
68. Id. at 877-78.
69. Id. at 879. The court noted: the Wickline physician's conduct did not fall below the
standard of care; the funding process was made according to the state's administrative code
rather than by contract; and the Medi-Cal system was not one that intruded into a physi-
cian's medical judgment. Id.
70. Id. at 883 (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431).
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ated at all. Bush v. Dake7 1 is one such case that examined this question.
In Bush, the plaintiff alleged that her doctor's negligence in failing to take
a Pap smear test delayed her detection of cervical cancer.72 The plaintiff
claimed the HMO was liable because it provided financial incentives to
the physician, including capitation, which allegedly led to her lack of
treatment. 73 Pleading tortious interference with the patient-physician re-
lationship as one of her causes of action, the.plaintiff claimed that the
whole system providing financial incentives violated public policy.7 4 The
HMO countered by claiming it had mandatory quality assurance pro-'
grams in place to balance any incentive to undertreat 5 Further, it as-
serted, the physician's awareness of the potential of a malpractice claim
deterred him from underutilization.76 Thus, any incentive was weak at
best. The court stated, however, there was a material question of'fact for
a jury to decide.77 Because this case was unreported and eventually set-
tled out of court,78 its holding has little precedential value for other
courts confronting financial incentives. However, it reveals a willingness
of at least one court to examine the effects of risk sharing.
Though the Bush court was open to the possibility that physician incen-
tives could lead to MCO liability, most courts examining this issue decline
to rule similarly for a multitude of different reasons. In Pulvers v. Kaiser
Foundation Health Plan,79 the court refused to find HMO liability for
financial incentives, noting that the HMO Act of 1973 required its imple-
mentation. 8° Likewise, in McClellan v. Health Maintenance Organization
of Pennsylvania,8 the court stated that any decision to forbid risk sharing
was one of social policy, and thus should be made by the legislative
branch.82 The notion that financial incentives influence physician judg-
ment received its most skeptical treatment in Madsen v. Park Nicollet
71. No. 86-25767 NM-2, slip op. (Mich.. Cir. Ct. - Saginaw Cty. Apr. 27, 1989) (summa-
rized in Chittenden, supra note 2, at 481).
72. RODWIN, supra note 4, at 170.
73. Chittenden, supra note 2, at 481.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 482.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. RODWIN, supra note 4, at 170-71.
79. 160 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
80. Id. at 394 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1973)).
81. 604 A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), app. denied, 616 A.2d 985 (Pa. 1992).
82. Id. at 1056 n.6.
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Medical Center.s3 In that case, the court affirmed a ruling that barred
testimony regarding the physician's incentives because of its irrelevance
and potential for prejudice.'
From these cases it appears that the bulk of the judiciary is unwilling to
consider financial incentives as causative agents of adverse medical out-
comes. Yet, although the plaintiffs in all of these cases questioned the
effects of financial incentives, they did not attempt to establish that the
risk. sharing system in question was imperfect in its design, or implemen-
tation, in accordance with the framework of the Wickline and Wilson de-
cisions. Rather, they alleged that financial incentives per se should result
in liability. Courts might be less resistant to an argument suggesting lia-
bility due to imperfections in. the design of the financial incentives.
Hence, some courts might allow a jury to consider whether capitation
that did not properly account for risk led to an adverse medical outcome.
Even when courts are willing to examine the adequacy of capitation
rates, the plaintiff's claim might be preempted by the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). s5 For ERISA preemption
to apply, the lawsuit must revolve around an ERISA regulated plan. This
type of plan is defined broadly as "any plan... which was .. established
or maintained by an employer ... for the purpose of providing... medi-
cal.., care or benefits."86 The scope of the preemption of claims against
ERISA plans extends to any cause of action that "relates to" the em-
ployee benefit plan,87 a phrase that the Supreme Court has interpreted
expansively.88 Hence, lower courts are reluctant to apply state remedies
to cases where negligent implementation of cost containment has led to
the infliction of physical harm upon enrollees.89 When ERISA preempts
a state claim, a plaintiff can only seek limited remedies, such as equitable
remedies or those based on breach of fiduciary duty.' Because of the
83. 419 N.W.2d 511 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 431 N.W.2d 855
(Minn. 1988).
84. Id. at 515.
85. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1461 (1994)).
86. Id. § 1002.
87. Id. § 1144(a).
88. In Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983), the Court said that a law relates to
an employee benefit plan if "it has connection with or reference to such a plan." Id. at 97.
89. See, e.g., Holmes v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 706 F. Supp. 733 (C.D. Cal. 1989)
(holding that the defendant insurers alleged negligent delay in the denial of coverage for a
liver transplant, which supposedly caused the plaintiff's death, was a cause of action pre-
empted by ERISA).
90. Chittenden, supra note 2, at 491 (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)). Although the
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broad coverage of this statute, victims of an MCO's inadequate capitation
rate might find that ERISA severely limits their chances of recovering
damages.
IV. ASSESSING THE DEGREE OF RISK INCURRED
THROUGH CAPITATION
As legislative and judicial bodies have in some instances demonstrated
concern over risk sharing, they must develop a set of principles for judg-
ing whether any individual financing mechanism is inadequate. When
questioning capitation rates, lawmakers can use a financial risk analysis
approach to understand the determinants of risk. The logic of financial
risk analysis provides some insight into the intuitive calculations of a ra-
tional physician.9 Therefore, the various influences on risk, elucidated
by a financial risk analysis, should be examined in the context of an indi-
vidual physician's practice. If this application of risk principles leads to
the conclusion that a capitation rate is creating a loss for a physician, the
MCO should be found to have created too great an incentive for substan-
dard treatment. Legislatures should make such payment rates illegal, and
courts should find that the Wilson substantial factor test of causation has
been satisfied under these circumstances. In this way, lawmakers can
align the law more appropriately with market realities.
Although presently the law does not regulate physician capitation
rates, actuaries could calculate a minimum capitation rate that properly
would account for the physician's risk factor by evaluating all the ele-
ments of the physician's costs and variance of costs. Such a formula could
include: 1) the average cost of treating an enrollee;9" 2) the standard
claims under ERISA are severely limited, plaintiff attorneys are devising new ways to ac-
cord their complaints with ERISA requirements. For instance, in one case recently filed in
New York, the plaintiff has claimed that Aetna's use of capitation places their own eco-
nomic self-interest above the welfare of the patient in violation of the MCOs fiduciary duty
to the patient. Capitation: Aetna Sued Over Shift to Capitation Payments, HEALTH CARE
DAILY (BNA), Dec. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNA file (describing
Maltz v. Aetna Health Plans of N.Y., Inc. (E.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 19, 1995)). Yet in an oral
ruling, the court denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction. Provider Com-
pensation: Chronically Ill Patients Lose Bid to Keep Physicians Under Capitation, HEALTH
CARE DAILY (BNA), June 4, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNA file. Signifi-
cantly, Aetna re-evaluated its compensation package after a wave of complaints from its
patients and doctors, and now it has limited physician risk through higher capitation rates
and improved stop-loss coverage. Stephen Findlay, Can Capitation Save the World?, Bus.
& HEALTH, June 1996, at 44, 50.
91. Supra note 27 and accompanying text.
92. Cf. Bruce J. Ryan & Scott B. Clay, Funding Cash Reserves with Capitation Pay-
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deviation of these costs; 93 3) the utilization rate of the enrollee popula-
tion;94 4) the number of covered lives;95 5) the required profit margin;96
6) the expected incurred, but not reported, expenses ("IBNR"); 97 and, 7)
the required degree of certainty that the capitation rate will result in a
positive net cash flow.98 If a physician is working in a group practice, the
ments, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., May 1995, at 22, 22 (using average patient cost as part of
a statistical formula that informs a hospital under capitation if it has sufficient cash reserves
to withstand random fluctuations in enrollee utilization). This cost estimate should also
include indirect costs, such as replacement costs and working capital costs. Mark E. Toso
& Anne Farmer, Using Cost Accounting Data to Develop Capitation Rates, Topics IN
HEALTH CARE FIN., Fall 1994, at 1, 6-7.
93. Cf. Ryan & Clay, supra note 92, at 22 (including this figure in the formula). See
also supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text (defining the sources of a high standard
deviation of costs for a physician).
94. Cf Ryan & Clay, supra note 92, at 22 (deriving this figure for its formula from
demographic information). This figure also is influenced by the MCO's policies regarding
"phantom" patients. Phantom patients are those who remain unassigned until they come
in to see a physician. Gregory N. Herrle & William M. Pollock, Multispecialty Medical
Groups: Adapting to Capitation, J. HEALTH CARE FIN., Spring 1995, at 37, 42. The physi-
cians working in a plan with a significant number of phantom patients likely experience
higher costs because they have fewer patients for whom they are receiving capitation with-
out incurring costs in the performance of services.
95. Cf Ryan & Clay, supra note 92, at 22 (remarking that this figure can change over
the course of a contract).
96. Toso & Farmer, supra note 92, at 7.
97. Cf. Ryan & Clay, supra note 92, at 22 (remarking that a hospital's cash reserves
must be able to cover these expenses). IBNR refers to the cost of care delivered by other
providers for which a capitated physician is financially responsible. Borzo, supra note 30,
at 20.
98. Cf. Ryan & Clay, supra note 92, at 22 (indicating that increased certainty requires
increased cash reserves or increased income). Because the uncertainty associated with cap-
itation-based cash flow drives a physician to reduce his costs, the uncertainty factor is di-
rectly correlated with the strength of a financial incentive program. Lawmakers could
mandate that MCOs reduce the uncertainty associated with capitation by adjusting their
capitation rates to the point that the likelihood that the physician will obtain a positive net
cash flow is reasonably certain over the course of time. Once this required degree of cer-
tainty is established, each MCO would increase its capitation rate in direct proportion to
the variance of costs incurred by its physicians. This system would encourage physicians to
act reasonably under any capitated system. In this way, the net present values associated
with a patient base would become standardized across the industry.
This approach is similar to the approach financial analysts use to determine the price
they are willing to pay for a stock based on how the risk of a stock compares to the general
level of risk present in the market. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 11, at 161 (describ-
ing the capital asset pricing model). The capital asset pricing model standardizes the net
present value of investments throughout the industry. Just as SEC regulatory laws mandat-
ing disclosure have created the type of efficient, American markets in which the capital
asset pricing model has validity, laws requiring the standardization of risk premiums would
also promote efficiency. Such laws could cure present market distortions characterized by
a lack of an exchange of information regarding risk between MCOs and physicians. See
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minimum capitation rate should reflect the ability of the group to regu-
late its members' cash flow through diversification. 99 Furthermore, the
probable income from risk-free financing sources must be factored into
the equation before an accurate minimum capitation rate can be deter-
mined. 00 Once sound actuarial principles lead to the derivation of a
formula, legislators should rely on it as a benchmark of the legality of a
capitation system.1 'O In the absence of statutory provisions, courts and
juries should place great weight on actuarial evidence of the soundness of
a capitation rate in determining the likelihood that an MCO's rate was a
substantial factor in its physician's malpractice.
An analysis of the physician's capitated income, however, is not suffi-
cient per se. Usually capitation occurs in conjunction with many other
forms of financing. In combination with other payment mechanisms, the
risk imposed by capitation can be truncated significantly. 10 2 Thus, the
aggregated periodic payment rate should be used to determine the ade-
quacy of MCO disbursements to physicians. Some of the more common
reimbursement systems include: 1) bonuses;"0 3 2) withholds;"° 3) stop-
LEE, supra note 30, at 49-50 (describing how some MCOs are reluctant to share actuarial
information with providers).
99. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (describing the effects of
diversification).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41 (illustrating the advantages of risk free
income).
101. Although mandating an increase of capitation rates to match the level of risk in-
herent in a patient base removes much of the danger of capitation disincentives from physi-
cians, legislators should also mandate that physicians maintain capital reserves that match
the level of risk inherent in their cash flows. Even if a high capitation rate compensates for
a high risk level by assuring a positive cash flow over time, the physician practicing in such
an environment is subject to great volatility on a month to month basis. To protect the
physician and the patient under these circumstances, legislators should develop standards
for mandatory, risk-based capital reserves, as suggested by the NAIC. See supra notes 57-
58 and accompanying text (discussing recent NAIC activities).
102. See LEE, supra note 30, at 5 (emphasizing the need to look at payments in their
totality to better understand their ramifications on physician income).
103. Bonuses are payments made to a physician at the end of a set period. RODWIN,
supra note 4, at 140. Sometimes these payments are used as an incentive to keep referrals
down and are thus tied to individual performance. Id. In other systems, bonuses might be
distributed as a function of the MCO's overall profits, which therefore have only a diluted
incentive effect. Id. (citation omitted).
104. Withholds are the converse of bonuses. A portion of the capitated payments is
withheld until the end of a period as a reserve for referral and other expenses. Walker,
supra note 41, at 68. The unused portion is returned to the physician. Id. Like bonuses,
these can be based on individual performance or the performance of larger physician
groups within the MCO. Id.
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106loss payments;1°5 and, 4) carve-out fee-for-service payments. Because
these other mechanisms can alter, significantly the distribution of costs
facing a physician, courts and legislatures must assure that there are vari-
ables in any formula interpreting the adequacy of capitated payments that
consider these other cash flows where they are used.
V. CONTROL ARISING FROM CAPITATION
MCOs that use capitation might attempt to exert direct control over
physician decision-making through payment mechanisms in addition to
providing physicians with an incentive to reduce costs by placing them at
financial risk. MCOs realize that financial incentives are not always
strong enough to lead to cost-effective physician behavior. Hence, MCOs
have sought to play .an even more active role in health care delivery.
Although fee-for-service financing agents rarely have placed limits on the
kinds of treatment-related expenditures for which they provide reim-
bursement," 7 MCOs set their capitation rates based on their own esti-
mates of the amount of reasonable expenditures a cost-conscious
physician would make."°8 Thus, physicians who rely on capitated pay-
105. These are payments that are triggered by excess expenditures. RODWIN, supra
note 4, at 142. They can be based upon excess expenditures to a patient in each pay period,
or on the basis of the costs of referrals. Id.
106. Because certain services, such as chemotherapy and neonatal intensive care, can
be very expensive, physicians sometimes arrange for these to be reimbursed on a fee-for-
service basis while remaining under capitation for all other services. See, e.g., Stephen E.
Jacobs, M.D., Why We Love Capitation, MED. ECON., Apr. 24, 1995, at 51, 56 (describing
one physician group's experiences with capitation). Certain patients could also be subject
to a carve-out provision. LEE, supra note 30, at 16. For instance, treating diabetic patients
can lead to costs for a physician that are as much as four standard deviations greater than
those of an average family physician. Page, supra note 9, at 4. Inadequate capitated com-
pensation for sicker diabetic patients often results in inadequate referrals and various types
of harm to patients, such as blindness. Id. Because of the severity of financial incentives
under capitation with these kinds of patients, fee-for-service better ensures the safety of
these patients.
107. Typically, a fee-for-service plan reimburses members for all medically necessary
services. BERMAN & ROSE, supra note 5, at 29. However, unnecessary services and experi-
mental treatments are usually not covered. Id. at 29-30.
108. See Walker, supra note 41, at 64 (claiming that HMOs try to implement their goals
of reducing care through their capitation rates). Utilization review is another system relied
on by many MCOs to control expenditures. Robert J. Conrad, Jr. & Patrick D. Seiter,
Health Plan Liability in the Age of Managed Care, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 191, 191 (1995).
Within this system, the plan looks at a request for reimbursement for services either pro-
spectively, concurrently, or retrospectively. Based on its evaluation, it renders a decision
as to whether it will reimburse the health care delivery agent for its services. Id. Whereas
retrospective utilization review simply results in a dispute between the provider and the
payor, concurrent and prospective review can result in'denial of a patient's access to serv-
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ments are forced to practice more cost effectively. By controlling a physi-
cian's health care related expenditures, however, the MCO restrains the
physician from practicing in the same manner as he would under condi-
tions of full autonomy. 10 9 When capitation leads to such control, the law
should consider whether the MCO and the physician have de facto be-
come one entity for the purposes of evaluating malpractice liability.
A. Economic Model of Control
In a market with equilibrium conditions, buyers and sellers form a con-
sensus regarding a good." 0 They make decisions about the good's price
as well as the particular features included in the production of the
good."' Yet transaction costs sometimes cause sellers and buyers to
enter into some form of integration that alleviates some of their costs."'
Once the buyer and seller enter into some form of integration, all re-
source allocation decisions are controlled centrally within the firm.1' 3
When the transaction costs leading to the integration are asymmetrical,
the more powerful party tends to behave opportunistically." 4 This op-
portunistic behavior within the integrated unit could manifest itself in the
stronger party claiming the right to control the joint resources necessarily
resulting in its control over the price and the characteristics of the seller's
ices. Id. See also supra part III.B (discussing the role of utilization review in both the
Wickline and the Wilson decisions).
109. Because of the importance of cost control to MCOs, they often terminate physi-
cians from their network who fail to lower costs, even when those costs legitimately are
related to the treatment of sicker patients. Julie Johnsson & Mike Mitka, Managed Care
Maelstrom: Physicians are Seeing Their Practices Dwindle When Insurers Use Economic
Criteria to Bar Them from Networks, AM. MED. NEWS, July 25, 1994, at 1, 17. This threat
of termination leads many physicians to act in ways that are medically questionable. How-
ard Larkin, Lurking Liabilities: Managed Care Can Add an Unforeseen Layer of Risk, AM.
MED. NEWS, June 26, 1995, at 9, 9.
110. See ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTI-
CAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL 11 (1983) (indicating that individual buyers and sellers
determine market supply and demand in the aggregate).
111. See id. (stating that market supply and demand govern resource allocation).
112. Id. at 12 (defining transaction costs as "any expenditure of resources associated
with the use of the market in transferring a good service from one party to another").
Blair and Kaserman assert that total merger might not be necessary to achieve the benefits
of integration, as many parties have found contract formation to be an easier way to ac-
complish the same goal of avoiding market transactions. Id. at 26.
113. Id. at 11.
114. See BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 110, at 22 (suggesting that limited number of
potential contract partners could lead to an imbalance of power).
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output.' 15 Although nominally the buyer and seller might remain sepa-
rate firms, the relationship between them indicates that for some pur-
poses, they should be considered one unit.
B. Application of the Economic Model of Control to Capitation
In an optimal health care market, an MCO and a physician will agree
to a reimbursement schedule under which the physician receives market
rates for the delivery of a standard set of services. Sometimes, however,
the parties experience transaction costs that cause them to integrate,
which results in centralized decisions regarding resource allocation.
Within this integration process, the physician may have less bargaining
power than the MCO, which can lead the MCO to behave opportunisti-
cally. The MCO might take advantage of its power by extracting the right
to make all the decisions regarding the allocation of resources within the
network.' 16 This allocation likely would entail the MCO's unilaterally
setting the physician's rate of capitation, which would limit the physi-
cian's ability to consume resources in his practice.1 17 By restricting
purchases of goods and services used in a physician's practice, the MCO
exerts control over the range of services he can provide.1 18 Conse-
quently, capitation results in this type of control over the physician's
practice. Therefore, courts should look beyond the form of the relation-
ship to its substance, and find that the MCO and the physician are part of
the same unit.
VI. POTENTIAL LEGAL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CONTROL
Whereas improper risk sharing could lead to the MCO's direct liability
115. See id. at 11 (quoting Coase's economic definition of the firm as "the supersession
of the price mechanism").
116. Id.
117. See LEE, supra note 30, at 51 (stating that powerful MCOs sometimes refuse to
negotiate capitation contracts with providers).
118. Specialists' practices especially are affected by HMO capitation levels. They have
high equipment costs, and thus an HMO with a high share of their patient base can cause
specialists to forego buying or replacing equipment. See, e.g., Managed Care ... A View
from the Inside, supra note 27, at 28 (discussing one radiologist's fears about his continued
ability to buy equipment needed in his practice in the face of a potential ratcheting down of
his capitation level). Although primary care physicians do not rely as heavily on expensive
equipment in their practices, constraints on financing can alter their decisions as well. For
instance, if they are responsible for referral costs, an MCO could control the extent that
they rely on specialist services by adjusting their capitation payment to meet only the refer-
ral needs that the MCO would find legitimate. Cf supra note 35 and accompanying text
(describing the effects on a physician's risk level of capitating him for referral services).
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for inadequate medical treatment, controlling a physician's practice might
lead to imposition of vicarious liability on the MCO for the physician's
treatment. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the establishment
of a master-servant relationship causes the master to assume liability for
the servant's conduct when acting within the scope of his employment. 119
There is no single factor that is dispositive of a master-servant relation-
ship, but courts often place emphasis on the degree of control the alleged
master exerts over the alleged servant's work. 2 ' Although an MCO that
employs its physicians has sufficient control over them to establish an
agency relationship, courts have been less consistent, however, in deter-
mining if this requisite level of control is present where the MCO has a
contractual relationship with the provider. 12 1 No court has considered
the capital restraints, imposed by capitation, as the source of control over
the physician's behavior in a contractual relationship between the MCO
and physician; but several cases have examined the existence of a master-
servant relationship between contracting parties in the managed care con-
text with varying outcomes. 122
One of the first cases to examine MCO liability under the doctrine of
respondeat superior for the negligence of a physician with whom the
MCO had only contractual relations is Schleier v. Kaiser Foundation
Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc.123 In this case, Kaiser con-
tracted with a cardiologist to examine one of its patients.' 24 As'a result of
the physician's misdiagnosis, the patient died. 25 Despite the fact that the
parties were only joined together through a contract, the court held that a
master-servant relationship existed. 26 The court found that the requisite
control existed based on the fact that the doctor could not act indepen-
dently of the Kaiser physician who engaged his services.' 2 7 By looking at
the substance, as opposed to the mere form, of the relationship, the court
established precedent for finding an MCO vicariously liable for a con-
tracting physician where the MCO controls his conduct.
119. PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 70 (5th ed. 1984).
120. Chittenden, supra note 2, at 454.
121. See infra discussion of the Schleier, Dunn, Raglin, Mitts, and Propst decisions and
accompanying notes.
122. See infra discussion of the Schleier and Dunn decisions and accompanying notes.
123. 876 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
124. Id. at 176.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 178.
127. Id. at 177. Other evidence of a master-servant relationship that the court relied on
includes: Kaiser having selected the physician; it retaining the ability to dismiss him; and
the physician and Kaiser being in the same line of business. Id. at 177-78.
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In a similar examination of the doctrine of respondeat superior in the
context of a contractual relationship, a New Jersey court also found liabil-
ity of the defendant HMO in Dunn v. Praiss.12 s In this case, the court
held that the HMO was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior
for a urological group's failure to diagnose and treat testicular cancer.
129
This liability attached to the HMO despite the fact that the urologists had
only contractual relations with the entity.130 The court found it particu-
larly relevant that the urology clinic was paid on a capitated basis, which
in some way exercised control over its physicians' practice. 13' Although
this court did not state the reason why it believed capitation controlled
the physician's practice, its precedent makes it easier to find vicarious
liability for an MCO that uses capitation to control a physician by con-
straining his health care expenditures.
In contrast to these precedents, other courts investigating similar rela-
tions have declined to find a master-servant relationship in similar cases.
In Raglin v. HMO Illinois Inc.,132 the court refused to go beyond the form
of the independent contractor relationship to investigate whether the
HMO had in fact exerted sufficient control over its physicians to find vi-
carious liability. 133 In Mitts v. H. I. P. of Greater N.Y, 1 the court .af-
firmed the lower court's finding that the HMO was not involved in the
delivery-of health care because it was merely the financing agent. 135 Ac-
cordingly, the different lines of business of the two parties meant that
there was no agency relationship. 136 Similarly, in Propst v. Health Main-
tenance Plan, Inc.,'1 the court claimed that the state's prohibition against
the corporate practice of medicine meant that the HMO was not involved
in health care delivery, which resulted in an absolute bar to finding HMO
liability for a physician's malpractice. 38 For these courts, therefore,
there are legal principles that override the weight usually accorded evi-
dence of an MCO's control over its contracting physicians. Because legal
128. 606 A.2d 862 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 656 A.2d
413 (N.J. 1995).
129. Id. at 868.
130. Id.
131. Id. The court also found evidence of control in the HMO's ability to restrict
referrals by the urologists. Id.
132. 595 N.E.2d 153 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
133. Id. at 156.
134. 478 N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
135. Id. at 911.
136. Id.
137. 582 N.E.2d 1142 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990). '
138. Id. at 1143.
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analysis does not always correspond to economic analysis, some jurisdic-
tions might choose to ignore the integrated nature of the payor and pro-
vider and thus decline to find respondeat superior liability for the MCO.
Yet even where courts are willing to prioritize the substance of an
MCO/provider agreement over its form, they might find that ERISA
preempts them. If the claim relates to a plan that is of the type usually
regulated by ERISA, a plaintiff might find himself limited to only ERISA
remedies. 139 However, claims involving vicarious liability of an MCO are
related only peripherally to the insurer's role as plan administrator, and
thus they are less susceptible to ERISA preemption than cases involving
direct liability.140 Thus, the success of a vicarious liability claim based on
the MCO's control over a physician's practice through its capitation rates
likely is to be determined by the legal climate of the jurisdiction in which
the case is brought.
VII. ASSESSING THE DEGREE OF CONTROL EXERTED
THROUGH CAPITATION
An analysis of an MCO's control over its physician's mode of practice
through its capitation rates can greatly help those courts that are deter-
mined to understand the degree of payor/provider integration in assessing
vicarious liability. To find control, it is first necessary to discover if the
MCO set the physician's capitation rates unilaterally. Thus, whenever
possible, courts should look at direct evidence indicating the MCO's role
in setting the physician's capitation rates. When this evidence is either
not available, or ambiguous, courts can benefit from an understanding of
the economic conditions that predispose an MCO toward controlling its
provider's capitation rate. Accordingly, courts should examine whether
the balance of power within the MCO/physician relationship is one where
there is a high probability that the MCO unilaterally set the rate . 4' If
either of these factors point to the MCO's responsibility for the physi-
cian's capitation rate, the court should then determine whether the rate
set by the MCO is intrinsically fair and nonrestrictive of the physician's
139. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA's effect on claims
surrounding an entity's direct liability for the administration of its plan).
140. See, e.g., Independence HMO v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983, 989 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (re-
jecting ERISA preemption of a malpractice claim against an IPA model HMO, which was
being held vicariously liable for its participating physician's conduct); cf DeGenova v.
Ansel, 555 A.2d 147, 150 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (overturning a lower court's ruling that a
claim of vicarious liability for a group insurer was preempted by ERISA).
141. See supra Part V.B (asserting that a strong MCO could demand the right to set a
physician's capitation rate).
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practice. Where the court determines that the MCO defined its pro-
vider's practice parameters through its rate of capitation, it should deem
this economic control sufficient for finding the MCO legally liable for its
physician's malpractice under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The clearest evidence of whether the MCO places financial restraints
on its physicians comes from direct evidence that the MCO sets its capita-
tion rates unilaterally. In some instances, there might be direct evidence
that a powerful MCO refused to negotiate its capitation terms with its
providers. Such evidence might include uniform capitation rates by area
of practice imposed on all MCO's physicians, or a form letter sent to all
physicians explaining that the capitation terms are not subject to negotia-
tion.142 When such evidence appears, the court should presume that the
capitation rate set by the MCO represents a constraint on a physician's
practice-related expenditures, that also has the effect of controlling his
mode of practice. It is unlikely that such evidence will be readily accessi-
ble in most cases. Thus, a court should not consider its existence disposi-
tive of the question of an MCO's control over its physicians.
Even if there is little or no evidence regarding the party responsible for
setting capitation rates within a network, courts should look further into
the nature of the relationship between the MCO and the physician to
infer if the MCO is likely to set the capitation rate unilaterally because of
its power in the relationship. This imbalance of power most probably
arises when the physician has few entities with whom he can contract.
143
To find that the balance of power sways toward the MCO, courts should
thus look for two conditions: 1) whether the MCO occupies a large per-
centage of the physician's practice; 144 and, 2) whether the physician ex-
periences barriers to selling his services to other purchasers.1 45 Taken
together, these two conditions result in a lack of access either to actual or
potential payors outside of the controlling MCO. Hence, the physician in
this situation depends on the MCO's capitation to remain solvent, and is
likely to yield to the MCO regarding capitation rate decisions. When the
practice environment fulfills both of these conditions, courts should de-
cide that the MCO has set the physician's capitation rates. Based on this
142. See LEE, supra note 30, at 49 (stating that some MCOs have standard contracts in
which they refuse to negotiate on a physician by physician basis).
143. BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 110, at 22.
144. Cf. PHILLIP AREEDA & Louis KAPLUM, ANTITRUsT ANALYSIS 567 (discussing
how the conventional approach to measuring market power is to look at the market share
of a firm, in the relevant market).
145. Cf id. at 21 (pointing out that monopoly power requires the reinforcement of bar-
riers to entry).
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decision, courts should presume MCO control over both the physician's
health care-related expenditures and his style of practice through its
rates.
Unless the MCO accounts for a significant percentage of the physi-
cian's practice, it could not possibly control the physician's income suffi-
ciently to determine his choice of resources consumed in his practice.
Until a certain point, the physician can terminate his agreement with the
MCO without serious ramifications to his own financial well-being. This
lack of dependence on the MCO means that he is less likely to allow the
MCO to control the negotiating process. However, once the MCO be-
comes critical to his solvency, by occupying a large percentage of his prac-
tice, the physician is more likely to make concessions to this powerful
financing agent.' 46 Thus, an MCO's high share of a physician's practice
should trigger a court's heightened scrutiny when investigating a claim of
vicarious liability.
*Yet even when an MCO accounts for such a large portion of a physi-
cian's practice, it cannot successfully control his consumption of resources
unless the physician has no other financing options. Otherwise, the physi-
cian likely would switch to another reimbursement entity before sacrific-
ing his autonomy. There are many reasons why a physician could lack
access to other financing. For instance, the MCO might be the dominant
force in the health care financing market because of its enrollment of a
high percentage of the patient population.'47 In such a case, the provider
would have no choice but to accept the MCO's agreement terms. 148 Con-
versely, the MCO would also have leverage where there are many com-
146. See Walker, supra note 41, at 71 (describing how one physician group that became
dependent on an HMO who controlled 35% of its patient base could not quit the plan
despite that it was losing money because of its declining capitation rate). See also Joseph
Mack, Managed Care Relationships from the Physician's Perspective, ToPicS IN HEALTH
CARE FIN., Winter 1993, at 38, 41 (claiming that physicians cannot easily leave an HMO
that accounts for approximately 40% of their practice revenue because of their reliance on
the capitation payments). Although reliance on an MCO that accounts for a large share of
a 'physician's income could lead physicians to make increased concessions to the entity,
many physicians eventually reach a point where the financial loss is better than the growing
intrusion into their practice. This widely felt sentiment probably explains why the rate of
physician turnover ultimately increases as a function of the HMO's share of the physician's
patient base. Joseph Kerstein et al., Primary Care Physician Turnover in HMOs, HEALTH
SERVICES RES., Apr. 1994, at 17, 35.
147. LEE, supra note 30, at 6.
148. LEE, supra note 30, at 6. Similarly, there could be a financing market with only a
few insurers. In this situation, the insurers could all tacitly agree on a low capitation rate,
which would also lead to a physician's restricted access to a sufficient amount of capital to
run his practice in a way he considers standard. Cf PHILLIP AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW,
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peting providers in the physician's geographic and practice area." 9 If the
market has experienced high HMO market penetration, the MCO could
limit severely the physician's options by placing exclusionary restraints on
the physician that would prohibit him from offering his services to other
MCOs. 15° Further, a physician's reputation could be tied to the MCO's
reputation that no patients with fee-for-service insurance would consider
using his services.1 51 Once the court finds that an MCO exerts strength
through its large share of the physician's practice, it should decide that
the MCO set the physician's capitation rate unilaterally, which should
lead to the presumption of MCO control over the physician's practice.
To further reinforce a presumption of control through capitation, a
court may examine if the MCO has reshaped the physician's practice to
help him adjust to his reduced income. For instance, the MCO might
engage in such practices as: 1) training physicians on how to practice in a
capitated environment;' 52 2) issuing practice guidelines that help physi-
cians stay within their budgets; 53 or, 3) making decisions as to which phy-
sicians in a network are responsible for the provision of certain
services.154 These measures all seek to show the physician how to prac-
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 278 (4th ed. 1988) (describing the way an industry that has only a
few firms predisposes the firms within it towards engaging in subtle price coordination).
149. Cf Glenn A. Melnick et al., The Effects of Market Structure and Bargaining Posi-
tion on Hospital Prices, 11 J. HEALTH ECON. 217, 227 (1992) (explaining that among hospi-.
tals, excess capacity in a market has an inverse correlation with the bargaining power of
any individual hospital).
150. See LEE, supra note 30, at 30 (noting that MCO's exclusive agreements with spe-
cialists limit their ability to negotiate higher capitation rates). Cf. Julie Johnsson, Magic
Carpet Ride? An Exclusive Provider Deal May Seem Enchanted - Until the Insurer Pulls the
Rug Out, AM. MED. NEWS, June 13, 1994, at 37, 37 (illustrating one hospital's problem of
retaining control over its practice when a contracting HMO extracted an exclusionary re-.
straint over the hospital and accounted for 65% of its patient base).
151. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 41, at 71 (describing how one physician practice faced
difficulty rebuilding its fee-for-service practice because the community believed that it was
exclusively an HMO clinic).
152. See Alan L. Hillman, M.D., M.B.A., Cost-Containment Incentives in HMOs:
What's Known, What's Not Known, CONSULTANT, July 1989, at 84, 88 (discussing how
HMOs routinely educate physicians about efficient resource utilization).
153. See Charles Culhane, Streamlining for Managed Care, AM. MED. NEWS, Apr. 11,
1994, at 21, 22 (remarking that MCOs often formulate guidelines for their physicians). The
author further states that many physicians in managed care environments rely on these
guidelines to stay within budgetary constraints. Id. at 21. Chittenden asserts that the con-
trolling force of these guidelines could negate a physician's status as an independent con-
tractor. Chittenden, supra note 2, at 456-57.
154. See, e.g., Findlay, supra note 90, at 50 (explaining that there is a trend in managed
care toward expecting general practitioners to provide services for which they have inade-
quate training), As a result of this increased burden on primary care physicians to provide
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tice medicine under his new constraints resulting from his capitation
level. By using capitation as a tool to reformulate the physician's deci-
sion-making process, the MCO has, in effect, usurped a physician's role as
the care provider. Accordingly, when a court finds direct or indirect evi-
dence that the MCO has set the physician's capitation rates unilaterally,
as well as evidence of these further intrusions into a physician's practice
style, it should consider the presumption of control over the physician to
be very strong.
After a court finds a presumption of the MCO's exercise of control
over a physician's practice, the court should examine the capitation rate
to determine both its fairness and the extent to which it actually limits the
physician's expenditures on his practice. Even if the MCO seems to exert
control over a physician by dictating his capitation rate and by making
recommendations as to how to practice under capitation, substantively it
may have decided on a rate that is both fair and relatively similar in
amount to the payments the physician was receiving before capitation.155
Thus, courts would need to determine both the fair market value of the
physician's capitated services as well as the physician's traditional level of
reimbursement. When these measures indicate that the MCO did not
take advantage of its bargaining power in deciding the physician's capita-
tion rate, courts should decline to find control through capitation. How-
ever, when a court lacks evidence on the fairness of the capitation rate,
which would rebut the court's presumption of the MCO's control through
capitation, the court should consider its presumption of control con-
firmed. In such cases, the court would be justified in attaching vicarious
more services, there has been a rise in the number of malpractice claims against these
doctors for errors in diagnosis that could have been avoided through referrals to a special-
ist. Dolores Kong, Diagnosis Lawsuits Up, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 28, 1995, at 10E.
155. This analysis is similar to many corporate "duty of loyalty" statutes. Many of these
statutes require examination of the process followed by a determination whether a corpo-
rate decision was made by disinterested parties. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 144(a)(1),(2) (1991) (demanding informed consent of a quorum of disinterested directors
or shareholders to validate a contract tainted with a director's conflict of interest). Then,
statutes continue on to determine if the substance of a decision was nevertheless fair, de-
spite the role of interested parties in the decisions. See, e.g., id. § 144(a)(3) (allowing a
transaction that was fair at the time of execution to remain valid despite not being ratified
by disinterested parties). Similar to the fiduciary relationship between corporate execu-
tives and stockholders, doctors have a fiduciary relationship with their patients. Because
an agency relationship with an MCO creates a conflict of interest, it places the doctor in a
similar position to that of a corporate executive with conflicting goals. Just as a procedural
and substantive analysis of a corporation's decision protects the corporation's stockhold-
ers, the procedural and substantive analysis suggested here protects the physician's
patients.
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liability to the MCO for the substandard care provided by its physician-
agents.
VIII. CONCLUSION: OTHER PAYMENT POSSIBILITIES
Capitation partially solves some of the significant problems confronting
today's health care industry, but its resulting interference with physician
decision-making suggests that other payment mechanisms might better
achieve the same goals. One method of payment that has received some
acceptance recently is the resource based relative value scale
("RBRVS"). Invented by HCFA, this mechanism pays physicians a rate
based on the number of relative value units earned through their serv-
ices. 156 These units are determined by a physician's use of "physical and
mental effort, technical skill, and practice experience. ' 157 Thus, more ar-
duous tasks are rewarded with higher reimbursement. After setting this
baseline rate, HCFA makes adjustments for geographic practice costs. 158
It then multiplies this figure with a conversion factor that turns each ser-
vice into a dollar figure. 159 HCFA has different conversion factors for
primary care, nonsurgical services, and surgical services, and it has tried
to encourage evaluation and management services by shifting income
from surgical services, to primary care and nonsurgical services. 16° This
plan is also budget neutral so that overutilization one year results in a
lower conversion factor the next year.16' In this way, HCFA has used
RBRVS to contain costs while avoiding the intrusions into the medical
treatment process caused by capitation.
Because of all the benefits this kind of system could offer MCOs, it
merits serious consideration as a substitute for capitation. By shifting to
an RBRVS system, MCOs would create a new set of incentives. Whereas
capitation discourages all costly services regardless of their value to the
patient,' 62 RBRVS's relative value units create value by rewarding a phy-
sician for hard work. Hence, by shifting reimbursement methods, MCOs
156. David Azevedo, How Many Third Parties Will Buy Into RBRVS, MED. ECON., July
25, 1994, at 88, 88.
157. Id.
158. Greg Borzo, Medicare to Cut Payments to Physicians, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 25,
1995, at 1, 19.
159. Azevedo, supra note 156, at 88.
160. Id.
161. Borzo, supra note 158, at 19.
162. See RODWIN, supra note 4, at 136 (disputing that HMOs' risk sharing creates only
an incentive to eliminate wasteful services, and arguing that physicians have an incentive to
cut back on all services).
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can shift from cost based incentives to value based incentives, which
probably better accord with patient expectations. 163 Just as the govern-
ment makes. allowances for physicians with high practice costs, MCOs can
safeguard the solvency of the physician practices with.whom it contracts
by adjusting its relative value units to accommodate legitimately higher
costs. 164 Without onerous restraints on a physician's access to capital, this
payment system protects a physician's autonomy in his choice of practice
techniques.165 RBRVS conversion factors allow MCOs to prioritize pri-
mary care over specialty services by using different conversion factors for
the different types of services, and thus is similar to capitation in its goal
of incentivizing preventive care. MCOs can even achieve the goal of cost
containment through implementing a budget-neutrality policy in their
RBRVS systems.' 66 Although some MCOs already are working with
1671oesoRBRVS, many more should consider it because of its ability to create
value additivity, and to protect physician autonomy without sacrificing
preventive care incentives and cost containment.
Just as MCOs presently combine capitation with other payment mecha-
nisms to increase its effectiveness, RBRVS can also achieve greater suc-
cess when combined with other payment programs. Further cost
reduction can be achieved by rewarding physicians who follow guidelines
when a certain prognosis indicates its appropriateness. 68 Quality also
should be prioritized; each physician should have a certain percentage of
163. It also would greatly decrease the danger of being found liable for improper risk
sharing. See Part III.B (showing how a court might find liability for imperfections in the
design of a risk-sharing program).
164. See PAULY ET AL., supra note 1, at 107 (claiming that although it is fair to penalize
physicians whose practice style is especially lavish, it is inequitable to penalize a physician
whose sicker patients require increased expenditures).
165. See supra Part VI (demonstrating that encroachment into a physician's autonomy
might lead to an MCO's assumption of the physician's liability in some jurisdictions).
166. See supra Part I (describing capitation's role in managed care).
167. See, e.g., Capitation: Twin Cities Market Seen Moving Away from Capitation of
Health Providers, HEALTH CARE DAILY (BNA), Dec. 4,1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, BNA file (stating that some MCOs in the Twin Cities are moving from capitation
to a budget-neutral form of RBRVS).
168. See Herrle & Pollock, supra note 94, at 39 (asserting that making adjustments for
complying with guidelines can encourage efficiency in a setting that compensates physi-
cians based on their productivity). See also Leigh Page, Will Too Many Mergers Stifle
Competition, AM. MED. NEWS, July 11, 1994, at 1, 7 (describing how Twin City employers
have funded an institute where physicians can develop practice guidelines). By allowing
physicians to develop their own guidelines, an MCO greatly could diminish the risk of
exerting too much control over its physicians. See supra note 153 and accompanying text
(suggesting that guidelines might be problematic if imposed upon providers by an MCO).
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his pay connected to a measurement of the quality of his outcomes. 16 9
Through the combination of these techniques, utilization management
and quality health care can be achieved without the dangers of improper
risk shifting and intrusion into physician autonomy brought about by cap-
itation. Without these dangers, MCOs can be more certain that they will
not be exposed to liability for physician treatment decisions.
169. Cf., e.g., Cleveland Health Quality Choice, Summary Report, Dec. 7, 1994, at 2-3
(describing how the quality of treatment at each Cleveland hospital is evaluated periodi-
cally by a neutral organization that uses outcome measurements, patient surveys, and se-
verity adjustments in its assessments). Outcome measurements can also be used in
connection with capitation, but only a few plans have, as yet, implemented such a program.
Findlay, supra note 90, at 51.
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